Following an investigation into its certificate security incident, eMudhra has revoked eight more intermediate CA certificates due to improper handling of private keys during generation. This brings the total count of affected intermediate CA certificates to 16, with the first eight having private keys so weak they could be recovered almost instantly.

In an incident report released Tuesday, eMudhra disclosed that both sets of certificates were impacted by a custom Python script deployed in April 2025 to move certificate authority keys between hardware security modules (HSMs) from different vendors. The company developed the script to address delays in procuring new hardware for its facilities.

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HSMs are specialized devices built to securely generate and store cryptographic keys, ensuring that sensitive private keys remain protected within the hardware and never exposed externally.

The script contained a defect that compressed eight ECDSA private keys down to a single byte, making recovery trivial. Additionally, the script processed eight RSA private keys by handling sensitive key material in the computer's memory rather than keeping it secured within the HSM.

Although the RSA keys were not weakened in the same manner as the original eight certificates, eMudhra stated it could not verify that these keys met its certificate security policies. The company revoked the additional eight RSA intermediate CA certificates on November 7, which had been used to issue both TLS and code-signing certificates.

According to the incident report, "A re‑import performed from host process memory is not consistent with the CPS §6.2.6 and the RSA objects are therefore treated as not meeting that requirement." Some of the affected RSA intermediates had been actively issuing certificates since May 2026, with the most recent certificate issued on November 3. eMudhra has confirmed that affected customer certificates have been replaced or migrated.

Earlier warning signs missed

The investigation revealed that a problem detected in June 2025 could have exposed the flaw more than a year before it was discovered. At that time, eMudhra identified certificate revocation lists (CRLs) signed with private keys that did not correspond to the associated CA certificates. The company resolved the issue by signing the revocation lists with the correct keys but did not examine the underlying cause.

This turned out to be an early indicator of the defective key-generation process that remained undetected until October 2026, when a security researcher known as Wayne uncovered the vulnerability. The investigation also determined that eMudhra failed to validate the strength of generated private keys or confirm that the keys used for certification matched those originally created in the HSM.

Browser protections and exit from TLS business

When Wayne disclosed the incident on October 17, the discovery showed that eight eMudhra intermediate CA private keys could be recovered by testing only 256 possible values. The compromised certificates were trusted by major browsers and operating systems, creating a potential pathway for attackers to forge certificates for legitimate websites and intercept encrypted traffic.

Mozilla, Google, Apple, and other vendors released protections to block the compromised certificates. Microsoft issued out-of-band Windows updates on October 26 to remove trust in affected eMudhra certificate chains on systems unable to receive automatic certificate trust updates.

In response to the incident, eMudhra announced its withdrawal from the publicly trusted TLS certificate business and plans to migrate its remaining customers to another provider. The company intends to cease issuing certificates under its remaining G1 hierarchy by November 16.

eMudhra has engaged KPMG to conduct an independent review of its certificate management and key-generation procedures, with results expected by December 4. The company states it has found no evidence that the compromised keys were exploited maliciously.