Quad9, a Swiss non-profit organization, recently announced plans to cease operating its free public DNS resolver in France after enduring months of court battles and facing daily financial penalties for its refusal to block domains tied to copyright infringement allegations. The organization found itself trapped between accepting crippling legal costs and penalties, or compromising the privacy and security protections that define its service. Faced with these impossible choices, Quad9 determined that withdrawal was the only viable path forward.
This departure represents a significant setback for the open Internet and serves as a cautionary indicator of what lies ahead if copyright holders and regulators persist in demanding comprehensive blocking measures across every layer of Internet infrastructure. The loss of Quad9's resolver deprives French users of a dependable security and privacy tool, while simultaneously creating genuine risk of service disruption for the diverse organizations relying on it—including government agencies, schools, hospitals, and utility companies. Because Quad9's architecture prioritizes user privacy, the organization cannot directly notify affected parties of the impending service termination, leaving many users to discover the outage only when their Internet access fails without explanation.
Quad9 is not an isolated case. Cisco previously withdrew its OpenDNS resolver from France, Portugal, and Belgium (the latter temporarily) under comparable blocking mandates. More recently, a Belgian court issued an order threatening substantial penalties against Cloudflare, Google, and Cisco if they do not implement DNS blocking by early January 2027—a requirement Cloudflare has consistently refused to meet. Cloudflare has long opposed such orders, warning that escalating demands for blocking by public DNS resolvers will inflict genuine damage on the Internet ecosystem.
Understanding DNS and Its Role in Internet Infrastructure
DNS resolvers form a critical foundation of Internet infrastructure. The Domain Name System functions as the Internet's address book: when users enter a website address like cloudflare.com, DNS translates that domain name into the IP address required for connection. A DNS resolver performs this lookup and returns the address to the user's device, similar to a directory operator locating a telephone number.
While anyone can operate a DNS resolver, they are typically managed by Internet service providers, mobile carriers, businesses, and educational institutions. Most home users rely on their ISP's default resolver without conscious consideration. Because DNS resolvers process every website visit, reliability and trustworthiness are essential. Additionally, since resolvers access complete browsing histories, the choice of resolver carries significant privacy implications.
Beyond ISP-provided resolvers, numerous public DNS services exist. Cloudflare introduced its public DNS resolver 1.1.1.1 in April 2018 with the goal of providing a fast, reliable, and privacy-focused consumer DNS service at no cost. The service collects no user data and does not sell information to advertisers. 1.1.1.1 ranks among the world's fastest DNS resolvers and represents a core example of Cloudflare's mission to improve the Internet.
Other prominent public resolvers include Quad9's 9.9.9.9, Google's 8.8.8.8, and Cisco's OpenDNS. Operating a global public DNS resolver at scale is an extraordinary engineering challenge, requiring secure and private handling of hundreds of billions or even trillions of queries daily across a globally distributed infrastructure of hundreds of server locations. Users can easily switch resolvers for various reasons including performance, reliability, or access to specific security features. Many alternative resolvers operate with minimal transparency regarding their practices and data handling.
Why Mandated DNS Blocking Is Fundamentally Flawed
Copyright holders have legitimate concerns about online piracy, yet requiring public DNS resolvers to block content represents a misguided strategy. Consider the directory operator analogy: if a court orders the directory operator to remove an illegal business's name from the phone book, the business itself remains operational. The storefront stays open, inventory remains available, and anyone with prior knowledge of the address or access to another directory can still visit. Internet blocking operates identically. DNS resolvers occupy only one point in the transmission chain and cannot remove actual infringing content or shut down hosting servers.
DNS blocking proves remarkably simple to circumvent. Any user seeking access to a blocked site can switch to one of thousands of alternative DNS resolvers in under a minute. Users need not employ a resolver at all if they already possess the underlying IP address. While blocking may create friction for casual users, evidence demonstrates it does not reduce the total volume of online infringement occurring.
Beyond ineffectiveness, DNS blocking functions as a blunt instrument generating collateral damage. Because DNS operates at the domain level, resolvers cannot target specific infringing content; they must block entire domains, affecting all material hosted there regardless of legality. The blocking remains invisible to users—sites simply fail to load with no explanation or legal notice, making it impossible to distinguish between maintenance outages, network failures, or court-ordered blocks.
The problem intensifies with public DNS resolvers operating globally. Any blocking naturally crosses borders, allowing a single nation to dictate content accessibility worldwide. For instance, the EU-dedicated resolver DNS4EU, operated by Whalebone, applies country-specific blocking orders across the entire European Union. Redesigning public resolvers to enable localized blocking would fundamentally alter their architecture, degrading performance and resilience, compromising user privacy, and fragmenting the open Internet.
Cloudflare, Google, Cisco, and Quad9 have collectively opposed mandatory DNS blocking with some success. German courts previously ruled in favor of Cloudflare and Quad9, rejecting demands for DNS blocking. A French court similarly declined to penalize Cloudflare for refusing to block through 1.1.1.1, determining that other measures through Cloudflare's CDN and reverse-proxy services satisfied compliance requirements.
Despite these victories, copyright holders persist with remarkable determination in pressing for resolver blocking. Research indicates that the majority of European online piracy is hosted within Europe itself. If copyright holders genuinely sought to address infringement, their efforts would be better directed toward hosting providers that actually store pirated files, requiring those providers to remove content.
The Real Cost of Removing DNS Resolvers From Markets
The French court's penalty order against Quad9 represents the culmination of copyright holder pressure. As a small non-profit offering only a public DNS resolver, Quad9 possessed no alternative compliance methods. The French court consequently granted copyright holders' request for penalties, forcing Quad9 to either compromise its service or exit the country.
Quad9's departure constitutes a genuine loss for the Internet. Short-term consequences likely include immediate and severe Internet access disruptions. Due to Quad9's privacy-preserving architecture, the organization cannot identify its users or directly communicate the service withdrawal. Individuals, hospitals, universities, and government offices may face sudden outages with no warning. Because DNS resolvers do not provide detailed error messages, users will simply experience Internet failure. Devices like security systems or thermostats hardwired to Quad9's resolver will face particularly difficult recovery scenarios.
Removing Quad9 from France accomplishes nothing toward preventing infringement while leaving everyday Internet users with diminished options for safe, reliable DNS services—particularly those offering protection against phishing and malware. Eliminating established public resolvers forces users toward ISP-provided defaults that may monetize browsing data, lesser-known resolvers operated by untrustworthy entities, or self-hosted solutions. The irony is stark: transparent, reputable organizations like Quad9 and Cloudflare face legal action precisely because of their accountability and openness. Penalizing transparent services only drives users toward less accountable alternatives.
A Better Path Forward
Quad9's announcement should serve as a warning that attempting to block infringement at every Internet layer carries genuine costs. More effective approaches exist for collaborative piracy prevention without compromising Internet integrity. Cloudflare continues pursuing innovative partnerships focused on removing content at the hosting provider level—a solution that achieves more durable results while avoiding collateral Internet damage.
Cloudflare, along with Google and Cisco, has appealed the Belgian order threatening penalties for DNS blocking by January 2027. The organizations hope to secure resolution before year-end, preventing another situation comparable to Quad9's French withdrawal. Cloudflare remains deeply concerned about disruption that would result from additional resolver withdrawals and will continue opposing efforts to mandate DNS blocking.