BRICS New Delhi Declaration and Subsea Cable Mandate

During the XVIII BRICS Summit held in New Delhi from September 12–13, 2026, under the theme "Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability," member nations formalized submarine cable infrastructure as essential to digital sovereignty and network resilience across emerging markets.

The BRICS New Delhi Declaration, released on September 12, 2026, elevated subsea cables to a strategic priority. Paragraph 74 of the declaration acknowledges submarine cable infrastructure as foundational for international digital connectivity and network resilience among BRICS members. The text references a Task Force that produced the "BRICS Cable Requirements: directive brief" following the Rio de Janeiro Declaration of 2025, which had proposed a "Technical and Economic Feasibility Study" for a high-speed communication network via submarine cables connecting BRICS nations.

We acknowledge that submarine cable infrastructure for BRICS countries is an important foundation for international digital connectivity and network resilience. We appreciate the coordination of a dedicated Task Force that concluded the document "BRICS Cable Requirements: directive brief", following the Rio de Janeiro Declaration of 2025, which welcomed the discussion of undertaking a "Technical and Economic Feasibility Study" for establishing a high-speed communication network through submarine cables between the BRICS countries. In this regard, we support continued dialogue and cooperation on voluntary basis among BRICS countries, in accordance with national circumstances and priorities.

Paragraph 74, BRICS New Delhi Declaration

Western Alliance Frameworks: Australia-India Dialogue and Quad Coordination

Parallel to its BRICS engagement, India pursues subsea cable strategy through bilateral and minilateral partnerships anchored in Western security alignments, particularly via the Australia-India Cables Dialogue and the Quad Partnership on Cable Connectivity and Resilience.

Australia-India Cables Dialogue

Backed by Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), this Track 1.5 dialogue identifies supply chain vulnerabilities, expands landing points across the Indian Ocean, and mitigates risks from market concentration in manufacturing and repair operations.

Quad Cable Initiatives

India collaborates with Australia, Japan, and the United States through Australia's Cable Connectivity and Resilience Centre to fund trusted Indo-Pacific infrastructure and develop Undersea Domain Awareness (UDA) protocols.

AUKUS-Adjacent Security Alignment

Although AUKUS concentrates on defense capabilities, its focus on seabed warfare, autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs), and acoustic monitoring aligns with India's objective of protecting critical undersea data routes in the Indian Ocean.

The Core Contradiction: Chinese Manufacturing Dominance and Indian Security Rules

A fundamental tension undermines the BRICS subsea agenda: China is the sole BRICS member capable of end-to-end trans-oceanic cable manufacturing and installation. India, Russia, Brazil, and South Africa lack domestic capacity for optical fiber production, high-voltage repeater manufacturing, or deep-sea cable-laying fleets.

India's National Security Directive on Telecommunication Sector imposes strict requirements: telecom operators must obtain certification from the National Cyber Security Coordinator (NCSC) via the Trusted Telecom Portal before integrating hardware into domestic networks. Chinese suppliers, including HMN Tech, face outright prohibition from landing subsea cables on Indian territory or supplying core transmission equipment for domestic landing stations due to geopolitical tensions.

This creates an insurmountable legal barrier: if a unified BRICS cable system were constructed using Chinese technology, India could not legally permit the cable to land in Mumbai, Chennai, or Tuticorin without breaching its own federal telecommunications security laws.

Operational Mechanisms for Dual-Track Navigation

India manages this diplomatic tension—participating in BRICS dialogue while maintaining strict alignment with Western infrastructure security—through four operational pathways:

  • Multi-Vendor System Segmentation: A single BRICS cable network is divided into separate operational segments, with Western-trusted suppliers manufacturing and laying segments terminating in India, while Chinese vendors handle segments between non-aligned landing points.
  • Open-Access Interconnection at Neutral Hubs: Rather than hosting a Chinese-built cable landing on mainland India, the country connects to BRICS data streams at neutral third-party hubs such as the UAE, Oman, or Singapore via carrier-neutral, open-access handoffs.
  • Focus on Software and Security Norms over Hardware: Within BRICS STI and ICT Steering Committees, India redirects discussions away from joint physical procurement toward software security, data localization norms, and cross-border cyber incident response.
  • Exercise of Voluntary Clauses: Paragraph 74 of the New Delhi Declaration explicitly permits cooperation "on a voluntary basis... in accordance with national circumstances and priorities," enabling India to endorse joint BRICS communiqués while declining to participate in physical infrastructure builds that conflict with Quad commitments or domestic security directives.

By invoking voluntary provisions in BRICS communiqués while enforcing strict "Trusted Source" vendor filtering domestically, India preserves its diplomatic credibility within the Global South without compromising its security alignment with Western partners across the Indo-Pacific subsea infrastructure landscape.